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STATE LAW AND THE FEDERAL COURTS.
The origin of the word government is at least significant. It
comes from the Latin word gubernaculum, meaning rudder.
The Romans compared the state to a vessel and under this metaphorical conception government became the rudder of the ship
of state. The people of the United States are in the position of
having a rather dependable society or ship but are in the very
unhappy plight of having two rudders designed for the same
vessel. It is true that the design seemed practical. Such rudders were to be employed for different sea-faring conditions.
The Federal rudder, it was contemplated, would direct the ship
while sailing the waters of national affairs. The State rudder,
on the other hand, was to guide the ship when cruising the seas
of local concern. Unfortunately, we find both frequently being
operated at the same time, under the same conditions and very
often at cross-purposes. The attending confusion is both evident
and deplorable.
One of the'major reasons for this state of confusion is the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.' Never was this more convincingly
illustrated than in the decision of the case of Black & White
Taxicab &.Transfer Co v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co.,2 in which the State of Kentucky saw the firm hand of the
Supreme Court immolate the public policy of the state upon the
altar of a misconceived and doubtful doctrine.
The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows: The
stockholders of a taxicab corporation organized in Kentucky
wished to enter into a contract with a Kentucky railway corporation for the exclusive privilege of maintaining a cab stand
on the railway property in a certain locality. Realizing that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals holds such exclusive contracts void
as monopolistic and contrary to public policy,3 the stockholders
in the taxicab corporation dissolved the company and reincorporated in Tennessee. The Tennessee corporation entered into
such a contract with the Kentucky railway corporation. The
116 Pet. 1 (1842).
48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404 (1928).
'Mc~onnel v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465 (1892).
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defendant, a rival taxicab company, persisted in occupying a
portion of the railway property devoted to taxicab purposes and
the Tennessee corporation instituted injunction proceedings in
the federal district court to enjoin the defendant company from
using the space. The injunction was granted and was ultimately
affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, which held
that the question was one of general law and that the Court was
not bound by the decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
Ir. Justice Holmes vigorously dissented from the decision
and the dissent had the concurrence of Mr. Justice Brandeis and
Mr. Justice Stone. There have been registered many dissenting
opinions in the frequent application of the Story doctrine of
independent federal judicial determination, 4 while its constant
extension has been the occasion for recurring criticism on the
part of legal writers. The writers could hardly hope to add
greatly to the literature on this subject. The source of the law
applied by the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases,
however, is a vital question of such vital import as to justify an
inquiry into the constitutional pedigree of this juridical progeny
of Mr. Justice Story.
The Constitution of the United States provides :5
"The judicial Power shall extend

.

.

.

to Controversies

between Citizens of different States

It has been argued that this' diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred upon the federal courts to protect a citizen
of one state against the legal tender and stay laws of another
state.6 Hamilton, in the Federalist papers, also asserts that the
'Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S.494 (1875), Justices Miller,
Davis, Field; Town of Genoa v. Woodruff, 92'U. S. 502 (1875), Justices
Davis, Field; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1892),
Justices Fuller, Field; Muhlker v. NV. Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U. S. 544
(1904), Justices Fuller, Holmes, White, Peckham; Kuhn v. Fairmont
Goal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (1909), Justices Holmes, White, McKenna;
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S.182 (1924),

Justices Holmes and Brandeis concurred on grounds opposed to the
doctrine; Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow

Taxicab & Transfer Go., 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404 (1928), Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone.
6Art. III, Sec. 2.
0Warren, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 82.
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purpose was to vitalze the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Constitution.7 He says:8
"And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it
Will follow that in order to the invoidable maintenance of -thatequality
of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which
one State or its Citizens are opposed to another State or its Citizens."

It would seem that protection of the foregoing rights would
be fully accorded through a writ of error from the Supreme
Court to the State Court and that a positive invasion of a constitutional provision could thus be adequately controlled without
the necessity for the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. As
a matter of fact the real reason for the jurisdiction in question,
according to the weight of contemporaneous opinion, was to
afford a court in which the citizen of one state might have the
laws of another state administered to him in a manner free from
local bias, passion and prejudice. These local influences might
enter into the administration of the state law in an insidious
manner that would be a distinct disadvantage to a non-resident
without having the appearance of the invasion of any positive
provision of the Constitution.
That such was the true purpose of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is evidenced by the federal judicial opinions in
a number of cases extending down through the entire history
of the federal goveramelt. In the Bank of the United States
9
v. Deveauz, -Chief Justice Marshall says:
"The judicial department was introduced into the American Constitution under impressions, and with views, which are too apparent not
to be perceived by all. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states wll administer justice as impartially as those of
the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that -the
Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or
views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of
controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states."

In the ease of Dodge v. 'Woolsey"° it was remarked by Mr.
Justice Wayne:
"It was a suit between citiz6ns of different states, brought by plaintiff in the United States Cir. Ct. of Ohio; and the motive for seeking
'Art. IV, Sec. 2.
8Federalist, LXXX.
05 Cranch. 61, 87 (1809).
'18 How. 331, 354 (1855).
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that tribunal was, that his rights might be tried in one not subject
either to State or local influences. It places both parties under an
equality, in fact and in appearances; and whatever might have been
the result, neither could complain of the disinterestedness of -the court
which adjudged their rights."

This view was reiterated by Mr. Justice Curtis in the
famous Dred Scott case.' 1 Then again in the case of Lankford
v. Platte Iron Works,12 Mr. Justice Pitney in a dissenting opinion said:
"For this plaintiff-appellee is entitled to the enforcement of its
contract as it was made; and it invokes a Federal jurisdiction that was
established for -the very purpose of avoiding the Influence of local opinion."

That the essential purpose in providing for the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction was to remove the possibility of local
bias and prejudice in the administration of the law of the state
to a non-resident seems beyond question. At the time of the
framing and adoption of the Constitution and for half a century
afterwards there appears to have been no thought that the federal courts would apply a different law in a State to a non-resident than the State Court would apply to one of its own citizens. When John Marshall was questioned in the Virginia ratifying convention :18
"In what court and by what law in cases arising under the Citizenship Clause, the case would be tried?"

He answered:
"By the law of the place where the contract was made."

In order that there might be no question but that the federal
courts were to apply State law in such a case, the 34th section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed by the first Congress, provided:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."

That the principle of this section flows from .the constitutional provision relative to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
and that the enactment was a pure legislative declaration of fun"19 How. 393, 580 (1856).
U. S. 461, 478 (1914).
3Elliotts' Debates III, 651, 556, 657.
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damental constitutional principle has been constantly reiterated
by federal judicial opinion down to the present day. The enactment of this statute neither added to nor detracted from the
duty of the federal courts to apply the law of the states in such
cases.
In fact, the view that the 34th section of the original Judiciary Act was purely declaratory is evidenced by the opinion
of Mr. Justice Story, himself, rendered in the case of Ex parte
Biddle14 in the Federal Circuit Court for the Distkict of Massachusetts in 1822. He said:
"The process used in these courts is, in general, the same as in the
State courts; and the laws of the states are expressly declared -tobe the
rules of decision in trials at common law in cases where they apply.
And the same doctrine must have been held without this express provision, and must now be implied in all suits, where the lex loci is to
regulate the rights or remedies of the parties." (Italics ours).

Again, in the Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley,' 5 decided in
1829, Chief Justice Marshall declared:
"It has been said that the occupant law of Ohio, must, in conformity with the 34th section of the judicial act, be regarded as a rule of
decision in the courts of the United States. The laws of the states,
and the occupant law, like others, would be so regarded independent of
that special enactment." (Itallcs ours).

In the case of Bergman v. Bly, 6 Caldwell, Circuit Judge,
remarked:
"The general rule is that the laws of the several states shall be regarded as rules of decision in the Courts of the United States in cases
to which they apply. The Judicial act requires this, and it would be
the law independently of that enactment. Under this rule, the first
question which confronts a federal appellate court is, what is the local
law applicable to the case? The local law which furnishes the rule of
decision may consist of a statute, or of the decisions of its supreme
court, or both." (Italics ours).

That the "Rule of Decision" statute is unquestionably declaratory is still more convincingly established by the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Mason v. United States,'7
where the Court applied the principle to a suit in Equity while
the statute in question, in express terms, is restricted to trials
at Common Law. Mr. Justice Sutherland, delivering the opinion
of. the Court, said:
Fed. Cas. No. 1391 (1822).
5Z2 Pet. 492, 525 (1929).
166 Fed. 40, 43 (1895).
"260 U. S. 545, 558 (1923).
143
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"It was urged upon the argument that the statute which provides
that the laws of the several states shall be regarded as rules of decision
.in trils at common law In the courts of the United States, by impilcation excludes such laws as rules of decision in equity suits. The statute, however, is merely declarative of the rule which would exist in
the absence of the statute."

Since the 34th section of the Judiciary Act is merely declaratory it follows that the real basis for the limitation upon
the federal courts in the law which they apply under the
Diverse Citizenship Clause of the Constitution is the provision
which confers jurisdiction in such cases. Only by applying the
same law to a non-resident of a state as that state would apply
to one of its own citizens can the federal courts carry out the
basic purpose underlying their constitutional source of authority.
This limitation binds a federal court of equity to the same
extent that it does a federal court in a common law case, if the
question involved is one of substantive law. In fact, the Kentucky Taxicab case under discussion was a suit in equity for an
injunction and the failure of the federal court to apply the
proper law was just as much a violation of the constitutional
limitation of the court as it would have been had the suit been
one at common law.
That the purpose Congresa had in view in enacting the 34th
section of the Judiciary Act was merely by legislative pronouncement to emphasize the limitation placed upon the federal courts
by the Constitution and to silence the very argument that is employed to support the Story doctrine of independent federal judicial determination in matters of commercial and. general law,
is evidenced by the recent investigation of the original documents connected with this enactment. 18 For half a century federal judicial opinion recognized this fact or, at least, rendered
no opinion that was inconsistent with this view.
Then in 1842 Mr. Justice Story closed his eyes to the history of the Convention period, ignored the judicial tradition
that was as old as the government itself and launched the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson; 19 a doctrine that seems to grow in stature and develop in power by feeding on the fruits of its own
aggrandizement.
The question involved in the case was whether the plaintiff
was a holder in due course of a commercial paper, a bill of exWhrren, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 84.
"Hupra, note 1.
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change accepted in New York and later endorsed to the plaintiff
for a preexisting debt. 'Whilethe Supreme Court did not think
the question had been definitely settled by the New York decisions yet it assumed that the courts of the state did not regard
a preexisting debt as a good consideration to support the endorsement. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Air. Justice
Story said:
"But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled In New York, it
remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon this Court, if it

differs from the principles established in the general commercial law.

It is observable that the courts of New York do not found their decisions upon -thispoint upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient
local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles

of commercial law. It is, however, contended, that the thirty-fourth

section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, furnishes a rule obligatory
upon this Court to follow the decisions of the state tribunals in all
cases to which they apply. That section provides 'that the laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of

the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded

as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.' In order to maintain the argument,
it is essential, therefore, to hold, that the word 'laws,' in this section,
includes within the scope of its meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended
that the decisions 'of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only

evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws. They

are often reexmained, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves,
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. The laws of a state are more usually understood to
mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs having the force of laws.
In all the various cases which have hitherto come before us for decision, this Court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpreta-

tion of the thirty-fourth section limited its application to state laws

strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and
the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights
and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights

and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterri-

torlal in -their nature and character. It never has been supposed by
us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions
of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or
local usage of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example, to the
construction of ordinary contract or other written instruments, and
especially to questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that
Is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the
true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule
furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case. And
we have not the slightest difficulty in holding, and this section, upon
Its true intendment and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the
true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the
decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the decisions of the
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local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the
most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot
furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero,
adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be
in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world."

That the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in this case is based
upon a misconception of the 34th section of the Judiciary Act
has been irrefutably demonstrated by the investigations of Mr.
Warren, previously referred to,20 which disclose that the word
"laws" as used therein was intended to cover judicial decisions
of the state courts.21 In addition, the opinion rests upon the
more treacherous fallacy of supposing that the court is bound
by a Congressional enactment that is construed in such fashion
as to violate the fundamental purpose of the very constitutional
provision that confers jurisdiction upon the court in diversity
of citizenship cases. Either objection is fatal to the asserted
right of the federal courts to exercise an independent judgment
in the determination of matters relating to so-called commercial
and general jurisprudence. The only answer need be given to
the statement in the opinion, that,
"the law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared
to be in a great measure, not the law of a single Country only, but the
law of the commercial world,"

is that the law of the commercial world is not and cannot be
the law of a state except insofar as such law is incorporated
in the Constitution, declared by the statutes, or adopted by the
courts of the state. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissenting opinion in the Kentucky Taxicab case :22
"It is hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus,
to understand which clearly is the only task of any court concerned.
If there were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,
the courts of the United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law.
. . . Law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. . . . Whether and
how far and in what sense a rule shall be adopted, whether called common law or Kentucky law, is for the state alone to decide."
"Supra, notes 6, 18.
37 Harv. L. Rev. 49.
2Supra, note 2.
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In the same opinion Mr. Justice Holmes makes the following observation:23
the prevailing doctrine has been accepted upon a subtle
fallacy that never has been analyzed. If I am right the fallacy has
resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion
should make us hesitate to correct."
This spirited attack on the fundamental principle underlying
the doctrine is what one would expect from the keenly analytical mind of the venerable Justice, which makes it all the morm
surprising that after sweeping the constitutional props from
under this imposing idol with feet of clay, he should gather up
the broken fragments of the demolished diety and replace them
on the pedestal of his own consent-by saying:
"I should leave gwift v. Tyson4 undisturbed but I would not allow
it to spread the assumed dominion into new fields."
This is the only instance in which the attention of the writer
has been called to the unhappy spectacle of Mr. Justice Holmes
beating an intellectual retreat.
The one basic error that runs through the numerous decisions supporting the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 25 is the utter
reliance on the binding effect of the 34th section of the Judiciary
Act. According to federal judicial opinion itself, this section is
simply declaratory of the principle that flows from the constitutional grant of jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases.
When the federal courts, however, construe this enactment in
such a way as to allow for independent federal judicial determination, it ceases to be declaratory and becomes the vehicle for
the assertion of a power that is contrary to constitutional principle. While it is true that the Supreme Court is provided for
in the Constitution, yet all of the lower federal courts are the
creations of Congress. Uusally this would imply the right of
Congress to regulate these courts at its discretion and to provide
for the rules of decision by which their judgments should be rendered. It cannot be forgotten, however; that ours is a dual form
of government and that all federal power, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial, must justify its existence under the Constitution of the United States. A limited and delegated sovSupra, note 2.
Supra, note 1.
S

'5 Supra, note 1.
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ereignty can not claim resort to the analogies furnished by a complete and unlimited sovereignty. However logical the science of
government may be it cannot be resorted to for the purpose of
evading the manifest spirit of our fundamental law.
This being true, it is idle for the federal courts to quibble
over the phraseology of the "Rule of Decision" statute. That
the courts have gone unchecked in the error of their way by the
passive consent of Congress has been advanced as a weighty argument for the correctness of their view. Mr. Justice Brewer,
in rendering the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of
BaZtimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh,26 advanced such an argument:
"Notwithstanding the interpretation placed by this decision (Swift
v. Tyson)" upon the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
has never amended that section; so it must be taken as clear that the
construction thus placed is. the true construction, and acceptable to the
legislative as well as to the judicial branch of the government."

Such reasoning is so obviously unimpressive as to require no refutation. Mr. Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion in the same
case,2 8 however, entered this devastating response:
"The doctrine that the application of the so-called general and unwritten law of the country to control a state law, as expressed by its
courts, in conflict with it, has the sanction of Congress by its supposed
knowledge of the decisions of this Court to that effect, and Its subsequent silence respecting them, does not strike me as having any persuasive force. The silence of Congress against judicial encroachment
upon the authority of the States cannot be held to estop them from asserting the sovereign rights reserved -to them by the 10th Amendment
of the Constitution. Such silence can neither augment the powers of
-the general government nor impair those of the States. Silence by one
or both will not change the Constitution and convert the national government from one of delegated and limited powers, or dwarf the States
into subservient dependencies. Acquiescence in or silence under unauthorized power can never give legality to its exercise under our form
of government."

In the opinion of the writer there are three fundamental
objections to the soundness of the doctrine of independent federal judicial determination in diversity of citizenship cases:
I.

That the doctrine is a violation of the principle of comity
and is therefore contrary to sound judicial policy.
-149 U.S. 368, 372 (1893).
'Hupra, note 1.
21 S pra, note 26, at 399.
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II.

That the doctrine is predicated upon a misconception of the
"Rule of Decision" statute and is therefore violative of its
true intendment.
III. That the doctrine is a violation of the Diverse Citizenship
Clause of the Constitution and is therefore an unconstitutional assumption of power.
With regard to the first objection it may be well to recall
the principle upon which comity is founded. In the case of
Hilton v. GrUyot,29 Mr. Justice Gray remarked:
"'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the
other."

It is, in fact, the willingness of one court to give judicial recognition to the decisions of a foreign court in the interest of substantive justice, insofar as such recognition is in accord with the
sound policy of the forum. 'Whether based upon the idea of
comity or the principle of conflict of laws, it would seem that
the fedeial courts should apply the law of the state to a legal
situation properly localized in the state. The ingenious assumption that the federal court is applying the law of the state while
ignoring state judicial opinion is too ridiculous to require serious comment. No figment of theory can render acceptable the
fruits of intellectual dishonesty. The name to apply to such law
is purely an academic consideration. To apply one rule of substantive law in a case brought before the state court and a different rule where the identical case is in the federal cQurt, under
the assumption that the same law is being applied, is a rebuke
to ordinary intelligence. A resort to the principle of comity by
the federal courts would be manifestly fair and unquestionably
just to all parties concerned. In addition, it would remove a
decided obstacle from the pathway to judicial efficiency, as is
attested to by the following report of a learned committee :30
"In those parts of the country in which resort to the federal courts
in cases of diversity of citizenship is. common the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts on the ground of diverse citizenship
often causes much delay, expense, and uncertainty. . . . Moreover,
-159 U. S. 113, 163 (1895).
' Charles W. Eliot, Louis D. Brandeis, Moorfield Storey, Adolph J.
Rodenback, and Roscoe Pound, in Preliminary Report on Efficiency in
the Administration of Justice (1914) 28: See further, Mr. Henry J.
Friendly's treatment of the problem in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483.
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the difference In the view which state and federal courts respectively
take as to the law applicable to the same case results In irritation
which has somewhat impaired the usefulness of the federal courts ih
some localities."

While the application of the principle of comity might lead to a
solution, it is well to bear in mind that this approach merely
emphasizes what the federal courts should do, without raising
any contention as to what they are bound to do in order to give
effect to the purpose underlying diversity of citizenship jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution.
In connection with the second objection that the doctrine
of independent federal judicial determination is based upon a
misconception of the "Rule of Decision" statute, the writer has
already pointed out the investigation of Mr. Warren 3 1 which discloses that the word "laws" as used therein was intended to
apply to judicial decisions as well as legislative enactments. All
federal judicial opinion down to 1842 harmonizes with this view
of -the statute. Since, however, the statute has been misconstrued it has been suggested 32 that Congress amend the "Rule
of Decision" statute so as to require the federal courts to follow
state judicial decisions in diversity of citizenship cases. The
writer is of the opinion that such an amendment to the statute
would control the federal courts only because the statute would
then be thoroughly and unquestionably declaratory of the correct
constitutional principle contained in the Diverse Citizenship
Clause of the Constitution. For the federal courts to be governed by such an"amended statute simply because it is a Congressional enactment however, is to ignore the constitutional
issue involved. According to the spirit of the constitutional provision the federal ourts should be bound to follow state judicial
opinion in such cases regardless of the Congressional pronouncement in this connection. It is putting the cart before the horse
and declaratory detail above principle to force the states to rely
upon Congressional protection against the exercise of unwarranted judicial power on the part of the federal courts.
Thus, the third objection, that the doctrine is a violation of
the Diverse Citizenship Clause of the Constitution, is the most
basic approach to this controversy. True it is that many writers.
seem to accept the doctrine as definitely settled beyond all quesSupra, note 21.
333 Yale L. J.855, 859; Mills, 34 Am.L. Rev. 51, 68.

'1
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tion and appear content to merely point out its boundaries and
criticise its application to a given case. Such an attitude is an
unjustified condonation of a long-continued assumption of unconstitutional power. The extreme impracticability of the doctrine, its manifest unfairness, its tendency to confusion and its
seri6us impediment to judicial efficiency, all lead to the hope,
that the Supreme Court may yet be brought to the view that it
is unwise in practice, unsound in theory, and unconstitutional in
principle. The number and character of the dissenting opinions
on the part of members of the court might lead one to expect that
a slight shifting of individual opinion or the inevitable infusion
of new blood into the tribunal would rectify this error on the
part of the federal courts and serve to bring them once more into
line with the spirit of the constitutional provision and the letter
of the "Rule of Decision" statute.
No attempt has here been made to classify the types of cases
in which the federal courts have seen fit to exercise an independent judgment regardless of state judicial opinion. The list is
long and wearisome. Included in the term, "commercial and
general jurisprudence," in which complete independence is exercised on the part of the federal courts, may be mentioned:
Contracts; commercial paper; insurance policies; the relation
of master and sdrvant; exemption by a carrier from responsibility for negligence; the construction of a will; the effeQt to be
given to a contract of a person non compos mentisj estoppel;
negligence; priority as between assignees; and a h6rde of other
questions of the same general character. These are only a few
taken from a long and detailed list.33 Doubtless this list itself
is very incomplete. The impossibility of an accurate classification was commented upon in the case of HartfordFire Ins. Co.
v.Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 34 by Caldwell, Circuit Judge, who,
after a scathing denunciation of the conditions prevailing under
the doctrine, in his dissenting opinion, remarked:
"The general statement has been- often made that the federal
courts are not bound to follow the decisions of the state courts in
questions of general jurisprudence, when unaffected by state legislation; but no exact enumeration has ever been made, or ever can be
made, of the questions that come within this general definition. Moreover, the decisions of the supreme court relating to the subject are not
uniform and harmonious."
325

Corpus Juris 847-49.

3"70 Fed. 201, 209 (1895).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

The federal courts profess to 'follow the decisions of state
courts only as to matters of a fixed local character, such as rules
of real property or the interpretation of the Constitution or the
35
statutes of the state.
It is noteworthy that the opposition to the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson 8 is not confined to any so-called school of constitutional thought. The writer, like the great majority of others
interested in this problem, feels that for the protection of those
rights accorded to- the federal government by the Constitution,
no narrow construction of that instrument should restrain the
legitimate exercise of federal authority. In the regulation of
interstate commerce, the naturalization of aliens, the subject of
bankruptcies, matters of national defense, the conduct of foreign afairs, and in all other matters that are the proper subjects
of federal control, the general government should be accorded
full and complete recognition. To allow independent federal judicial determination in cases involving matter of a non-federal
nature, 'however, is wholly unnecessary to the protection of any
federal right. Regardless of its name, it is nothing more than
the capricious application of a federal common law to a nonfederal situation. The jurisdiction was imposed for no such
.purpose and the sooner the Supreme Court recognizes this fact
the sooner will it win additional respect from an already respectful people. Since 1842 the doctrine has had its sway, and instead of leading to uniformity of decisions as to matters of general law, 37 we find that it has merely serVed to create lack of unifortuity of decisions within a given state through the operation
of two distinct bodies of law to the same legal situation.
We find it the occasion for doubtful assignments of claims
in order to justify federal jurisdiction under the diversity of citizenship requirements. We see it turn certainty of legal principle into uncertainty and make substantive justice depend upon
jurisdictional chance and the skillful maneuvers of a legal game.
Since Swift v. Tyson3 8 for almost a century it has "on the
dubious waves of error tost," it is time its fallacious and ground"Dobie, Federal Procedure, 561 and 570.

"Supra, note 1.
' See Frankfurter, 13 Cornell L. Q. 529.
"Supra, note 1.
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less doctrine should be repudiated in the interest of sound policy
and constitutional principle.
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